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Post-Census Redistricting--A Primer
for State Legislators
By CHAPuEs G. WILLIAmSON, JR.'
In one week in June, 1964, the Supreme Court declared that
the legislatures of a third of the states were unconstitutionally
apportioned. Since that time state legislators have been wrestling
with head counts, existing political subdivisions, partisan con-
siderations, and often-incompatible constitutions to arrive at ap-
portionment plans which would pass constitutional muster. With
the report of the 1970 decennial census, the struggle begins anew.
Herewith, an inspection of the problems and some guidelines to
assist the bewildered legislator.
With the completion of the decennial census of 1970,1 state
legislatures and other bodies2 charged with the responsibility
will be occupied during the coming year or at their next session
with the business of redistricting3 their state for the purpose of
electing future representatives. Before the 1972 federal elections,
they must also add, reduce, or change congressional districts to
* Assistant Dean, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.S., 1946, United
States Military Academy; J.D. 1956, University of Michigan; LL.M. 1961, George-
town University. Former Circuit Judge, Twenty-Second Judicial District of Ken-
tucky.
The author wishes to acknowledge the able research assistance of Donna H.
Terry, second year law student.
1 Most states have constitutional provisions requiring reapportionment of one
or both (if bicameral) houses of the legislature every ten years, generally fol-
lowing the decennial census conducted by the federal government.
2 Generally, legislatures themselves attend to the reapportionment process.
However, in recent years, reapportionment has also been accomplished by courts,
boards and commissions. See Tables, Apportionment of Legislatures, CoUNcNM OF
STATE GovRNmi s, BOOK OF THm STATES 82-83 (1970-71). By permission of the
Council of State Governments, these tables are included as an appendix to this
article.
3 The terms districting, redistricting, apportionment, and reapportionment are
often used interchangeably. In his majority opinion in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964), Chief Justice Warren frequently seems to use apportionment to refer
to the process of creating state legislative districts and districting to define the
act of making congressional districts. See, e.g., 377 U.S. at 578. In this article the
same application will be made unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.
Further on the distinction see R. McKAY, BE'Poan-oNm=rr: TnE I.w AND
PoITcs OF EQuAL REPRESENTATION 6 (1965).
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conform to national population shifts revealed by the census.4
For most, this will be the second such exercise since 1962' when
the United States Supreme Court handed down its now famous
decision in Baker v. Carr.6
As these bodies charged with the task of redistricting face the
bell for Round Two of the quest for equal representation of the
nation's citizens, 7 it seems timely that the developments of the
past eight years be reviewed for the purpose of setting down some
basic guidelines for them-a primer, so to speak, for the state
legislator.8
4 Preliminary indications indicate that the following states will gain or lose
congressional seats as indicated: California (+5); Florida (+3); Arizona, Col-
orado and Texas (+I); Pennsylvania and New York (-2); and Alabama, Iowa,
North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, West Virginia and Wisconsin (-1). Except for
those states which will have only one representative (Alaska, Delaware, Nevada,
North Dakota, Vermont and Wyoming), all other states will undoubtedly have
to make substantial changes in their congressional districts to reflect population
shifts within the states.
5 Only Massachusetts and Oregon have escaped the necessity of-or demand
for-redistricting since 1960.
6869 U.S. 186 (1962).
7 The usual basis for apportionment is population. However, in Hawaii and
Tennessee both the senate and house are apportioned on the basis of registered
voters, as are the Massachusetts Senate and the Vermont House. A three judge
federal panel has recently held that apportionment of a legislature on the basis
of voter registration satisfies the Equal Protection Clause only if it produces
districts not substantially different from those which would have resulted from
a population basis. Klabr v. Williams, 313 F. Supp. 148 (D. Ariz. 1970).
sDuring the period under inspection, not only were the courts busy but the
"one man-one vote" decree of the Supreme Court generated an active response
on the part of the commentators as well. Their observations and conclusions make
up as much a part of this lesson as do the decisions of the courts and serve as
well to guide legislators in their task of reapportionment. A recent treatise and
probably the most exhaustive study on the post-Baker era of reapportionment is
R. DIXoN, DEMocRATIc REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POL-
rrics (1968) (hereinafter cited as DiXoN). Other excellent treatises and a collec-
tion of studies on the reapportionment process are R. CLAUDE, THE SUPREME
COURT AND TnE ELEcTonAL PRocEss (1970); R. McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT:
THE LAw Am PoLrTlcs OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION (1965) (hereinafter cited
as McKay; A. DE GRAZiA, APPORiTONMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1963); and THE POLrTIcs OF REAPPORTIONMENT (M. Jewelled. 1962). An early
monograph which predicted much of the Court's post-Baker considerations is P.
DAVID & R. EsENnanc, STATE LEGsL-T2vE REDICrnG (1962). Among the
many articles on the subject are McKay. Political Thicket and Crazy Quilts: Re-
apportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MrcH. L. REv. 645 (1963); McKay,
Courts, Congress and Reapportionment, 63 MicH. L. REV. 299 (1964); Barber,
Partisan Values in the Lower Courts: Reapportionment in Ohio and Michigan, 20
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 401 (1969); McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of
the Warren Court, 67 MicH. L. REV. 223 (1968); Irwin, Representation and
Election: The Reapportionment Cases in Retrospect, 67 MicH. L. REV. 729 (1969);
Dixon, Warren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail of "One Man - One Vote," 1969
SuP. CT. REV. 219, and Elliott, Prometheus, Proteus, Pondora, and Procrustes
Unbound: The Political Consequences of Reapportionment, 87 U. Cm. L. REV. 474
(1970). An exhaustive bibliography on the subject through 1965 is contained in
R. McKAY, supra at 476-85. REAPPORTIONMNT: Tim LAW AND PoLrrIcs OF EQUAL
REPRESENTATION (1965).
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I. Turnabout-The Umbrageous Disposition
The necessity of observing nice precisions in the redistricting
of both state and federal representative districts cannot be
attributed to Baker v. Carr for none were there given. Rather, it
arises from the gloss put upon that decision two years later in the
Reapportionment Cases,9 principally Chief Justice Warren's ma-
jority decision in Reynolds v. Sims.'° Nevertheless, the judicial
overview"- of the redistricting process does begin with Baker v.
Carr when the courts deigned to intrude into what Justice Frank-
furter termed the "political thicket",' 2 an area previously off limits
to federal courts.13
For one hundred seventy years the politicians elected to state
legislatures were generally free 14 to act as they chose in estab-
9 The opinions handed down on June 15, 1964, in which the Supreme Court
struck down legislative apportionment plans in six states are known as the Re-
apportionment Gases. They are Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (Alabama);
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (New York); Maryland Comm.
for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964) (Maryland); Davis v.
Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (Virginia); Roman v. Sinock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964)
(Delaware); and Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964)
(Colorado). One week later on June 22, 1964, the court in a series of per curiam
orders invalidated nine other legislative districting plans on the basis of the
Reapportionment Cases; Swann v. Adams, 378 U.S. 553 (1964) (Florida);
Meyers v. Thigpen, 378 U.S. 554 (1964) (Washington); Nolan v. Rhodis and
Sive v. Ellis, 378 U.S. 556 (1964) (Ohio); Williams v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558
(1964) (Oklahoma); Germano v. Kerner, 378 U.S. 560 (1964) (Illinois); Mar-
shall v. Hare, 378 U.S. 561 (1964) (Michigan); Hearne v. Smylie, 378 U.S. 563
(1964) (Idaho); Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564 (1964) (Connecticut);
and Hill v. Davis, 378 U.S. 565 (1964) (Iowa). For a discussion of the June 22
cases, see McKay, supra note 8, 147-60.
10 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
"1 Prior to Baker v. Carr the Supreme Court had on occasion intervened in
the area of legislative apportionment despite the "political question" doctrine but
on grounds other than those based on the fourteenth amendment announced by the
majority in Baker. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1959), the Court re-
lied on the fifteenth amendment to invalidate a legislative redistricting plan in-
cluding a gerrymander based on racial considerations.
In Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946) Justice Frankfurter
likened the intrusion of the judiciary into the matter of legislative apportionment
to entering a "political thicket."
13The finding by the Baker majority of justiciability of the subject matter,
viz., that a review of the constitutionality of legislative apportionment was not a"political question" provoked a vigorous (63 pages) dissent from Justice Frank-
furter whose opinion in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) had been the
modem pronouncement of such a doctrine.
14Although most state legislatures are required by their state's constitution
to reapportion their legislative seats periodically, many legislators ignored such
mandates and continued their existing plans decade after decade. For example,
in the two landmark cases, Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims, touching off the
reapportionment era, both the Tennessee and Alabama legislatures bad not re-
apportioned the two houses of their legislatures since 1901 despite constitutional
mandates to do so decennially.
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lisbing the boundaries of the representative districts from whence
they were elected. Indeed, they were equally as free not to act
at all if that were their whim. 5 No fear of judicial supervision of
the division of their states among themselves could deter them in
their deliberations because their actions were "political" and
hence not reviewable by the courts. In Baker, Mr. Justice Bren-
nan announced that the Court's hands-off policy with respect to
political questions applied only to the "relationship between the
[Federal] judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal
government and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the
States..." Since the "invidious discrimination"' 7 inherent in
malapportioned representative districts denied the underrepre-
sented the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment, the federal courts were held not lacking in
judicially manageable standards for assuming such protection;
hence the matter of reapportionment (and redistricting) were
properly matters for judicial supervision.' 8
15 Id.
16369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (emphasis supplied). The "political question"
doctrine as thus announced by Justice Brennan does not mean that federal dis-
tricts which have been established by state legislatures are not subject to the
overview asserted in Baker v. Carr. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964),
the Supreme Court extended this "one man-one vote" principal to congressional
districting by state legislatures using as a basis the requirements of Article 1,
Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution; no "political question' deterred the court
from reaching its conclusion.
17 The term "invidious discrimination" employed by Justice Clark in his con-
curring opinion in Baker was used to illustrate the result of the malapportionment
in the Tennessee legislature, viz., that those protesting the malapportionment
could not, as their opponents claimed, rectify the situation at the polls because
they could never elect enough representatives under the existing system who would
comply with the (state) constitutional mandate of decennial reapportionment
on a population basis. The term has appeared frequently as a talisman in many
of the cases involving legislative and congressional districting. Dixon defines
"invidious discrimination" as
discrimination of the kind constitutionally forbidden, [which] exists
when two factors are shown: first, that a "classification" pattern in regard
to a particular governmental activity or function, whether formally an-
nounced or not; and second, that the classification pattern has no under-
lying rational, ordering principle, consistently followed. DIXoN, supra
note 8, at 132.
183 69 U.S. 186, 226 (1962). Part of Justice Brennan's rejection of the "po-
litical question" doctrine rested on his assertion that because the discrimination
resulting from malapportionment of the fourteenth amendment, the Court had
judicially manageable standards to deal with such discrimination. Yet he had
earlier stated:
Beyond noting that we have no cause at this stage to doubt the District
Court will be able to fashion relief if violations of constitutional rights
(Continued on next page)
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Thus did the court venture into the political thicket feared by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green 9 and make what he
referred to in his dissent in Baker as an "umbrageous disposition"
which would catapult the lower courts of the country into a
mathematical quagmire. °
II. Disenfranchisement of Trees, Acres, Pastures,
History and Economic Interests
Having asserted its role in the supervision of the business of
legislative apportionment, the Court was not to be concerned
with standards until two years later when it handed down the
Reapportionment Cases."' In Reynolds v. Sims,22 the Chief Justice
on behalf of the Court majority established the basic rule: The
Equal Protection Clause requires that seats in both houses of a
bicameral state legislature be apportioned on a population basis.23
A corollary of this primary tenent is that no basis exists in fact
or in history for departing from the rule of apportionment on a
population basis for one of two houses of a bicameral state legisla-
ture in reliance upon an analogy to the federal scheme making
such allowance for the upper chamber.2 4 The Chief Justice did
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
are found, it is improper now to consider what remedy would be most
appropriate if appellants prevail at the trial. Id. at 198.
It was this cavalier entry into the "political thicket" approach which led to Justice
Frankfurter's most eloquent passage in his dissent and which has been most crit-
icized by commentators, e.g., Dixon terms the decision in Baker as a "three legged
stool with a crucial fourth leg left for further construction." DixoN, supra note
8, at 119.
Ss328 U.S. 549 (1946).
20 369 U.S. 186, 267-68 (1962). Justice Frankfurter's concern for the ad-
umbration of the basis for a legal calculus as a means of extricating the lower
courts from the mathematical quagmire did not go unnoticed. Chief Justice War-
ren in his opinion for the Court majority in Reynolds v. Sims observed, "We are
cautioned about the dangers of entering political thickets and mathematical
quagmires." 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964).
21 See note 9 supra.
22377 U.S. 533 (1964).
23 Id. at 568.
24 Id. at 575. The federal analogy is, of course, the allotment of seats in
one house of a bicameral legislature on a basis other than population, e.g., one
senate seat to each county regardless of population. The majority's opion on this
corollary provoked Justice Harlan's vigorous dissent which accused the majority
of ignoring both the language and the history of the controlling provisions of the
Constitution. He argued that the only limitation on state legislative apportion-
ment was that imposed by the Republican Form of Government Clause (U.S.
Const., Art IV, § 4). 377 U.S. 533, 591. On the Chief Justice's use of history on this
point see DixoN, supra note 8, at 277-82.
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assert, however, that the "concept of bicameralism is [not]
rendered anachronistic and meaningless when the predominant
basis of representation in the two state legislative bodies is
required to be the same population".2 5 Acknowledging that a
prime reason for bicameralism is to insure mature and deliberate
consideration of proposed legislative measures and to prevent
precipitate action thereon, the Court listed some suggestions for
making one body of a bicameral legislature politically different
from the other. Included are such methods as the use of multi-
member districts, different length of terms for members of the
separate bodies, and different sized districts.26
As to mathematical precision in achieving apportionment on
a population basis, the Court alluded that "minor inequities"
might constitutionally be permitted to exist in one house if
balanced off in the other;27 that "mathematical exactness or
precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement";28 and
that "more flexibility" might be constitutionally permissible in
state legislative apportionment than in congressional districting,
particularly where the observance of political subdivision lines is
an underlying consideration.29 All variations, however, are subject
25 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964).
26Id. at 577.
27 Id. at 577. At least one state has picked up the gauntlet on this point. In
its 1966 Senate Reapportionment Act, the New Mexico legislature, after finding
that its existing senate apportionment provisions presumably violated the Equal
Protection Clause, also found that
(E) Senatorial districts . . . are so created that, insofar as practical,
each senator will represent an equal number of persons based upon the
most recent federal decennial census for New Mexico and that the minor
mathematical disparity which exists is reasonable in view of the dif-
ficulties inherent in the geographic distribution of population and the
demographic and economic patterns of this large and sparsely populated
state; and
(1) Senatorial districts are created so that minor mathematical dis-
parities in the senate compensate for minor mathematical disparities in
the house.
(2) One senatorial district in particular is under-represented in the
Senate, and it should be noted that this senatorial district which is com-
posed of Curry County, is the same geographical area which is the most
over-represented geographical area in the house of representatives, and
that this under-representation in one house compensates for the over-
representation of the other. 1 NEw MEx. STAT. ANN. § 2-9-14, (Repl.
Vol. 1970).
28377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
29 Id. at 578. The majority opinion suggests that the leeway thus afforded
would permit the grouping of compact districts, thus discouraging partisan gerry-
mandering. Despite the flexibility promised, however, the Court appears to de-
(Continued on next page)
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to the qualification that they must be incident to the effectuation
of a rational state policy.8"
Finally, as to the frequency of legislative reapportionment,
the Court stated that decennial reapportionment appears to be a
rational approach meeting the minimal requirements for periodic
readjustment of legislative representation to account for popula-
tion shift and growth. Anything less frequent would be "con-
stitutionally suspect".31
Cognizance of the foregoing factors, then, serves as the
starting point for any legislature preparing for periodic readjust-
ment of its legislative districts as it approaches the Seventies and
Round Two32  of reapportionment and redistricting. The re-
mainder of this review will examine how valid and how applicable
have been the suggestions of the court in guiding legislatures
33
through the "mathematical quagmires".3 4
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
mand mathematical precision first, with dispensation, if any, afforded on rational
grounds. See Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
30 This qualification is stated at two points by Chief Justice Warren in the
majority opinion in Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533 at 579 and at 581. In the first use it
was used to qualify divergences from strict Population equality. In the second,
it was used to suggest that the character of the deviation might be suspect if
population were submerged as the controlling consideration as in the case of a
gerrymander. Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion amplified the qualification,
Id. at 623.
31 Id. at 583-84.
32 The analogy of the division of the reapportionment effort to the periods of
a boxing match bas been employed by, some to define the post-Baker cases as
Round One cases and the post-Reynods cases are Round Two cases. See e.g.,
McKAY at 5. Others treat the post-1970 census as Round Two. See, e.g., DIXo N
at 3. The latter usage is made in this article.
33 In a negative way, Justice Harlan sets forth a guide to legislators estab-
lishing legislative districts in his dissent in Reynolds. Among the factors which
he says would be unconstitutional to consider are history, economic or other
sorts of group interests, geographical considerations, desire to insure effective
representation for sparsely settled areas, availability to access of citizens to their
representatives, "unapproved" theories of bicameralism, occupation, attempts to
balance urban and rural power, and preferences of a majority of voters in the
states. 377 U.S. 533, 622-23. A suggested legislative approach has been made by
one commentator, Thompson, Problems of Legislative Representation: A Proposed
Solution, 6 WAKE FonEsT INTRA. L. Rev. 235 (1970).34 In his now famous predictions that supervision of the legislative apportion-
ment process would entangle the courts in political thickets and catapult them
into mathematical quagmires, Justice Frankfurter overlooked the fact that the
legislators would be in the quagires before the courts made the scene. Com-
mentators, however, have seeme to enjoy the mudbaths which have opened up
whole new fields of speculation. See, e.g., the mathematical gymnastics of John
Banzhaf in his discussions of weighted voting, Weighted Voting Doest't Work: A
Mathematical Analysis 19 Rr,. L. BEy. 317 (1965); Multi-Member Electoral Dis-
tricts-Do They Violate the "One Man, One Vote Principle, 75 YALE L. J. 1309
(Continued on next page)
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RuLEs AND OTBER TAism-Ns
A. Quality of Equality
Except for the Reapportionment Cases,3 5 there has been very
little scrutiny at the Supreme Court level as to the permissibility
of any departure from the ideal for reapportionment of state
legislative districts: exact equality based on population. Swann
v. Adams 6 and Kilgarlin v. Hill,31 handed down in 1967, are the
only state legislative reapportionment plans invalidated by the
Supreme Court for impermissible deviations,38 although several
cases involving congressional redistricting have been struck down
for this reason.39 To the extent that it remains valid, Chief Justice
Warren's observation in Reynolds that "more flexibility" would be
allowed in state reapportionment than in congressional redis-
tricting allows one to assume that the considerations for any
variation found permissible in a congressional redistricting setting
also would be valid in a state reapportionment situation; and that
what barely fails to receive approval in a congressional case would
not necessarily be fatal in a state case if otherwise rational in
evolution.40 Thus, the congressional cases, along with Swann and
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
(1966); and One Man, Votes: Mathematical Analysis of Voting Power and Effec-
tive Representation, 36 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 808 (1968).35 See note 9, supra and accompanying text. Because they were handed down
the same day the basic rules were given, the reapportionment cases other than
Reynolds do not serve as a basis of evaluation because they do not represent a
review of attempted compliances set forth therein.
36385 U.S. 440 (1967).
s386 U.S. 120 (1967).
38 While the Court has reviewed other state legislative districting plans since
the Reapportionment Cases, e.g., the Georgia and Hawaii plans in Fortson v.
Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), and Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), re-
spectively, were upheld. Only the Florida plan in Swann and the Texas plan in
Kilgarlin have been invalidated.39Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 894
U.S. 526 (1969); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 385 U.S. 450 (1967); Duddleston v.
Grills, 385 U.S. 455 (1967); and Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
40 PoesrDixon suggests that none of the flexibility for state legislative
districting suggested in Reynolds exists as a result of the interpretation made in
Swann:
[T]he effect of Reynolds and Swann is to destroy any basis for using
the term 'apportionment to describe the process of setting up legislative
seats of equal population. There is now simply a kaleidoscoped process
of using the current population and the current number of legislative
seats as the basis for creating a current, but temporary, set of equal
population districts. DIXoN, supra note 8, at 455. For a contrary view
see McKAY, supra note 8, at 221-22.
KENTUCKY LAW JouNAL[
Kilgarlin, should be considered as furnishing minimum guidelines
for the establishment of new state districts.
At this "relatively early stage of the reapportionment effort"41
two precepts have been laid down by the Court in evaluation
of legislative efforts to attain population equality in the districting
process. The first of these is the "as nearly as practicable
standard" pronounced in Wesberry v. Sanders.42 The other is
that the burden is on the state to present acceptable reasons for
the variation among populations of various districts, a rule set out
in Swann v. Adams. 43
1. Hitting the Mark
In light of the two rules just stated, the starting point in
achieving equality on a population basis for both state and con-
gressional redistricting is to arrive at the size of the ideal district.
This is determined by dividing the state population by the num-
ber of districts to be created. Presumably, the idea44 is to then
carve up the state so that each district, as nearly as practicable,
has a population of the size of the ideal district. In the review
of a redistricting case, the courts, after determining the ideal
district size, have considered the "percentage of deviation" of
each of the resulting districts from the state mean. In addition,
the ratio of the largest district population to the smallest district
population can be computed, a comparison which Mr. Justice
White has labeled the "Citizen Population Variance" [hereinafter
"CPV"]. 45 By substituting the population of each of the districts
for that of the largest district in the CPV fraction, the amount of
dilution of voting strength of the voter in each district larger
than the smallest may likewise be illustrated. In the two state
and several Congressional redistricting cases where the Court
has declared deviations to be unacceptable since the Reappor-
tionment Cases, the following percentage of variation and CPV's
have been found:
41 The chronology is that of Justice Fortas in his concurring opinion in Kirk-
patrick v. Preisler, 894 U.S. 526 at 540 (1969).
42876 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
43 385 U.S. 440, 443-444 (1967).44 Assuming single member districts.4 5 Swann v. Adams, 885 U.S. 440 (1967). See also Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,
385 U.S. 450 (1967).
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YEAR STATE RANGE OF PERCENT OF CPV
DEVIATION FROM MEAN
State Cases
House Senate House Senate
Above Below Above Below
1967 Florida46  ±15.3 -18.3 +10.6 -15.1 1.4 1.3
1967 Texas 47  +11.6 -14.8 ±10.7 -10.1 1.31 1.23
Congressional Cases
Above Below
1964 Georgia 46  ±108.9 -31.0 3.0
1967 Indiana 49  +7.2 -12.8 1.23
1967 Missouri °  +64.6 -31.5
1969 Missouri 1  +3.1 -2.8 1.06
1969 New York52  +6.45 -6.61 1.1453
In each case where a districting plan has been found unac-
ceptable, it has been on the basis that the state has failed to meet
the burden of justifying variations from the mean. In Wells v.
Rockefeller, 4 for example, there was a conscious effort by the
New York Legislature to create sub-states within the state with
near precise equality of population among the districts within the
sub-states but nevertheless with the same appreciation by the
legislature that on a statewide basis there was vast disparity in
the size of districts. In the second Missouri case, the legislature
did not attempt to achieve equality but apparently established
districts on what it predicted in advance would be percentage
deviation which the Court would accept-a mere two percent.55
46 Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
4 7 Yilgarin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967).4SWesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). Although Wesberry actually
preceded the Reapportionment Cases, it is included here to illustrate the range
of improved yet impermissible, deviation in congressional cases.
49 Duddleston v. Grills, 385 U.S. 455 (1967).
5o Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 385 U.S. 450 (1967).
51 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
SWe]s v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
53 While the table above is illustrative of a few cases considered by the
Supreme Court during the era under review. Professors Dixon and McKay have
both compiled extremely detailed appendices covering all states from the Baker
decision to their respective dates of publication. See McKAY, supra note 8, at 275
et seq.; and DixoN, supra note 8, at 589 et seq.
54 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
55 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969).
1970]
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One fatal flaw in the Missouri case may have been a concession
by the legislative proponents of the state plan that much greater
approximation at equality could have been attained by simply
transferring political subdivisions of known population between
contiguous districts.-5
A particularly ominous passage in the second Missouri case
is the Court majority's rejection of the proponents' argument that
the population variances should be considered de minimus with-
out the necessity of further justification. Mr. Justice Brennan for
the Court declared
The 'as nearly as practicable' standard requires that the state
make a good faith effort to achieve precise mathematical
equality [citing Reynolds]. Unless population variances among
congressional districts are shown to have resulted despite such
effort, the state must justify each variance, no matter how
small.57
Justice White, whose opinion for the majority in Swann had
apparently established the de minimus guideline, dissented vigor-
ously, finding the new rulings, "unduly rigid and unwarranted"
and suggesting as a rule of thumb that he would find satisfactory
variations between the largest and smallest districts of no more
than 10 percent to 15 percent absent unusual circumstances. 58
Apart from the lessons, if any, that can be learned from the
foregoing cases, the only other apparent license the court has
given for constitutionally permissible deviations from a strict
equality of population standard is that they must be "based on
legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational
state policy"." What is "rational", of course, is what Round One
has been all about and what presumably will be resolved as
Round Two cases come before the Court.
2. Multimember and Floterial Districts
Among the ways suggested by the Court for achieving political
distinction between the two houses of a bicameral legislature
563 94 U.S. at 529 (1969).
57 394 U.S. at 530-31 (1969), emphasis supplied.
58 Id. at 533. Justice Fortas who concurred with the majority also believed
the rejection of de minimus standards as inconsistent with the imperfection
of man implicit in the "as nearly as practicable" standard. 394 U.S. at 538.
See Comment 15 Vir_.. L. Rnv. 223 (1969).
59 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).
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were the creation of multimember and floterial districts.60 There
is no reason to believe that within the same state the use of such
districts must be limited to one of two houses of a bicameral
legislature. The suggestion, however, has been appealing to
legislatures and even more so, although not necessarily approv-
ingly, to the commentators.61
The creation of a multimember district is accomplished by
selection of a geographical, political or other subdivision of a
state containing, on a population basis, some multiple of the ideal
district from which the appropriate number of representatives
would then be elected at large. Since Reynolds, the Supreme
Court has upheld the constitutionality of such means of achieving
equality of representation. 2
The principal reasons for the resort to multimember districts
seem to be either circumvention of constitutional prohibitions
against subdivision of counties into districts63 or enhancement of
majority party control within an area by increasing the likelihood
that majority party candidates within the district will capture
most, if not all, of the seats alloted to the multimember district.
6 4
A "floterial" district is one which would include several
separate districts, none of which, by themselves, would be entitled
to additional representation; when, however, the combined popu-
lation of the several districts is considered, the area would be
60 Id.
61 See generally McKAY, supra note 8, at 262-4; DixoN, supra note 8, at
476-84; Jewell, Minority Representation: A Political or Judicial Question, 53 Ky.
L. J. 267 (1965); and Comment, Effective Representation and Multimember Dis-
tricts, 68 MicH. L. REV. 1577 (1970). "But the Equal Protection Clause does not
require that at least one house of a bicameral legislature consist of single-member
legislative districts (citing Fortson)." Burns v. Richardson 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966).62 E.g., Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965); and Burns v. Richardson,
384 U.S. 73 (1966).63 This is the legitimate use of multimember districts. See McKAY, supra note
8, at 42, 263.
6 4 The use of multimember districting to bury minorities, either political or
racial, has drawn repeated criticism. See generally R. Cr.AuD, TnE SUPREmE
CourT AND THE ELECToRAL PROCESS 184-89, 199 (1970); DIXON, supra note
8, at 457 ("winner-take-all characteristic of multimember districts"), 471-74;
Jewell, Minority Represetnation: A Political or Judicial Question, 54 Ky. L. J.
267, 276-86 (1965) ("wasted votes"); Elliott, Prometheus, Proteus, Pandora, and
Procrustes Unbound: The Political Consequences of Reapportionment, 37 U. Cm.
L. REv. 474, 489 (1970) ("Constitutionally decent burial in multimember dis-
tricts"); and Comment, 69 Micn. L. REv. 1577 (1970). Justice Douglas in his
concurring opinion in Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 126 (1967) criticized multi-
member districts because they allowed the majority to defeat the minority
on all fronts.
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entitled to an additional seat in the legislature.6 5 Although gen-
erally condemned by observers, the use of floterial districts has
received tacit judicial approval on a few occasions.
3. Weighted Voting
Some writers have suggested that the principle that one man's
vote is equal to another's might be attained without the necessity
of creating precisely equal districts by simply weighting the votes
of each representative in the legislature according to the number
of people he represents. There has been no review of this method
by the Court nor has the Court even suggested that such a plan
might be constitutionally permissible. Inspiration for such an
apportionment scheme could be derived from the overall emphasis
in the majority opinion in Reynolds and the specific reference
therein to a citizen's right to cast an "adequately weighted" vote."
Whether the denial of the right of a citizen to cast an adequately
weighted vote may be compensated for by his elected representa-
tive casting a disproportionately greater vote than legislators who
represent fewer people has yet to be determined. Of those who
have contemplated the possibilities of the weighted vote, the
better view seems to be that which points out that representatives
in the legislature do more than vote: they represent their con-
stituents and the representative character of the voter's legislator
ought to be protected against debasement as much as the quality
of his vote."'
B. Gerrymandering
It would be naive to suggest that legislators in setting out to
reapportion their state's legislative districts are thinking only in
65 In Davis v. Mann, 877 U.S. 678, 686 n.2 (1964), the court gives a defi-
nition and an example of how floterial districts might be used not only to increase
the representation of a populous area but also to give voters in a contiguous
area a voice in the legislature without having to create separate political subdi-
visions. The floterial district can also be used to stifle minorities in a manner
similar to that used in multimember districting. See note 63 supra.
66 See DIXON, supra note 8, at 516-20, 540-43; Banzhaf, Weighted Voting
Doesnt Work: A Mathematical Analysis, 19 RUT. L. Rev. 317 (1965); and
Comment, Equal Representation and the Weighted Voting Alternative, 79 YAIx
L. 3. 311 (1969).
67 A weighted voting plan was suggested as a stop-gap measure in New York
but rejected by the lower federal court in post-Reynolds districting litigation.
WMCA v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D. N.Y. 1965). The judgment was
subsequently vacated as moot by the Supreme Court following other resolution
of New York's reapportionment. Lomenzo v. WMCA 384 U.S. 887 (1966).
68 Reynolds v. Sims, 877 U.S. 533, 581.
69 See, e.g., Comment, Equal Representation and the Weighted Voting
Alternative, 79 YALE L. J. 311, 318-319 (1969).
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terms of achieving the ideal of mathematical exactness. Rather,
the majority party members in the legislature will most likely be
seeking to maintain or increase their party's advantage while
trying to adhere to the objective requirements of Reynolds v.
Sims. In this respect it seems clear that although the burden is on
the state to present acceptable reasons for the variations among
population of its several resulting districts,70 the burden is on the
opponent of a state districting scheme to establish that equally-
or nearly so-apportioned districts were arrived at on the basis of
other than legitimate considerations.71 The historic result of a
gerrymander is creation of a district containing a majority of
voters of the creators' own political party.7 More recently, with
the increasing effectiveness of voting by other than political minor-
ity groups, attempts have been made to gerrymander districts so
that minority voters therein are submerged within the district.73
While the Supreme Court has alluded to the possibility of a
finding of irrationality of legislative purpose where political or
racial considerations are the motivating factors,74 it has yet to
70 See text at note 43, supra.
71 Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 55-7 (1964). The Supreme Court in
Fortson v. Dorsey asserted that "plaintiffs have a difficult burden to meet in attack-
ing the constitutionality of this state statute," 379 U.S. 433 (1965). See also Burns v.
Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966). In all of these cases charges were made that
racial minorities had either been concentrated in districts or submerged in multi-
member districts. The Court in each case accepted the legitimate reasons ad-
vanced by the proponents of the plans and rejected the contentions of the plain-
tiffs on the ground that insufficient evidence had been offered to support their
claims of racial motivation. See DIXON, supra note 8, at 496.
72 See JEWELL Am PATrERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNIrm
STATES 70 (1966); and KEEFE AND OGuL, THE AmERIcAN LEorsrLATrv PRocEss
82 (1964).
7 3 See, e.g., the allegations of plaintiffs in the cases cited in note 70, supra.
See also R. CLAUDE, THE SuPsmam COURT Am Tim ELECrORAL PROCESS 82 (1970)
and DIXON, supra note 8, at 463.74 See Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). In rejecting a claim that
multimember districts had been employed to thrust foreign senators on a Negro
minority, justice Brennan said:
It might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multimember constit-
uency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular
case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of
racial or political elements of the voting population. When this is dem-
onstrated it will be time enough to consider whether the system still
passes constitutional muster. Id. at 439.
In Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966) involvin similar allegations, the
Court, through Justice Brennan, again rejected plaintiffs claims, and after citing
the foregoing passage from Fortson, stated that:
It may be that this invidious effect [of multimember district apportion-
ment schemes] can more easily be shown if, in contrast to the facts in
Fortson, districts are large in relation to the total number of legislators,
if districts are not appropriately subdistricted to assure distribution of
(Continued on next page)
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strike down a district created as the result of a political gerry-
mander. Even before Baker v. Can-, racially gerrymandered dis-
tricts were found unconstitutional by the federal courts. 5 Never-
theless, it would appear in cases where racial or political gerry-
mandering is alleged that a heavy burden rests upon those
attacking the legality of the districting plan and, absent any proof
of specific legislative intent of partisan or racial bias, the court,
or a majority of it, will not question legitimate reasons for the
"dragon-like" results of redistricting efforts.76
C. Other Tricks
As in the case of gerrymandering, legislatures have attempted
to deny representation to political or racial minorities by the use
of various schemes. Apart from the legitimate reasons given for
the resort to multimember districts, this device can effectively be
employed to deny effective representation to minority interests
by insuring, in a political context, that such districts contain a
majority of voters of the party controlling the legislature at the
time of reapportionment. In a racial context, such districts will
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
legislators that are resident over the entire district, or if such districts
characterize both houses of a bicameral legislature rather than one.
Id. at 88.
75 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 864 U.S. 339 (1960).
76 The district need not be dragon-like. Professor Dixon contends all dis-
tricting is gerrymandering. DIXON, supra note 8, at 462. The most mathematically
exact district can be the result of a gerrymander; indeed, this is the dilemma
that faces those attacking a districting plan on the basis of impermissible con-
siderations. In Fortson, for example, the court's finding that the districts satisfied
Reynolds' criteria that the "overriding objective must be substantial equality of
population among the districts" (379 U.S. at 486) drew the following reserva-
tion from Justice Harlan, concurring:
There is language in today's opinion unnecessary to the Court's resolu-
tion of this case, that might be taken to mean that the constitutionality
of state legislative apportionments must, in the last analysis, always be
judged in terms of simple arithmetic. . . . I desire expressly to reserve
for a case which squarely presents the issue. The question of whether the
principles announced in [the Reapportionment Cases] require such a
sterile approach to the concept of equal protection in the political field.
379 U.S. at 439-40.
Generally the court has refused to draw inferences of unconstitutional consider-
ations where more legitimate inferences were also present. Absent hard evidence,
such as legislative reports or similar documentary proof, mere suspicions, no
matter how valid, will not be accepted. On the gerrymander problem, generally, see
McK&Y, supra note 8, at 458-99; R. CLA DE, Tim SupnPsa CoURT An =ns ErXc-
Ton.AL Pnoczss 83-88 (1970); Jewell, Minority Representation: A Political or
Judicial Question, 53 Ky. L. 1. 267 (1965).
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be drawn to contain a majority of voters from the predominant
race."7
To ensure the effectiveness of such ploys and to decrease the
possibility that the minority, whether political or racial, might
achieve some representation by voting for candidates to fill less
than all the seats to be elected, some states have provisions which
require the invalidation of ballots which do not contain votes for
the full slate of positions. 78 The continued toleration of such a
practice seems doubtful and the wise legislator should not utilize
it to dilute minority voting strength.
D. Left-Over Problems
1. Basis of Reapportionment
Another factor remains to be considered: what is the base for
reapportionment? Is it the number of persons in the area to be
represented-literally one man-one vote? Or may the base be the
number of registered voters-a one voter-one vote approach?
Without question the first base mentioned is not only permissible
but is the base used for most reapportionment; but the Supreme
Court has also approved the use of registered voters as a base for
determining legislative districts, so long as such a base would not
substantially deviate from population figures.
79
77 See Comment, Effective Representation and Multimember Districts, 68
MicH. L. REv. 1577 (1970). The author uses a post-Fortson case from the
federal court in Indiana, Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D. Ind.
1969) redistricting order per curiam, 307 F. Su pp. 1362 (S.D. Ind. 1969),
prob. junis. noted, 397 U.S. 984 (1970), in which plaintiffs successfully chal-
lenged a multimember districting plan on the ground that ghetto residents had
suffered a dilution in their voting strength, to illustrate the procedural problems
inherent in such a proceeding. The case presents more forcefully the problems
avoided by the Court in Wright, Fortson and Burns and should be the nextsignificant case in the reapportionment effort.
78 On this technique, see DixoN, supra note 8, at 483; and Jewell, Minority
Representation: A Political or Judicial Question, 53 Ky. L. J. 267, 285 (1965),
both of whom cite Boineau v. Thornton 235 F. Supp. 175 (E.D.S.C. 1964), afFd
per curiam, 379 U.S. 15 (1964) in which a federal court in South Carolina dis-
missed a complaint attacking a state provision against "bullet" or "single shot"
ballot.79 Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1964): "We hold that the present
apportionment (on the basis of registered voters) satisfies the Equal Protection
Clause only because on this record it was found to have produced a distribution
of legislators not substantially different from that which would have resulted from
the use of a permissible population basis," 384 U.S. at 93. (emphasis supplied.)
In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969), the Court rejected an argu-
(Continued on next page)
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2. The Enigma of Representation
Finally, there is the most enigmatic issue of all that must be
resolved. The purpose of insisting on one man-one vote is so
that each legislator will represent, as nearly as possible, the same
number of voters. Or, conversely, to assure each voter that he will
have as much voice as the man in the next county or the other
end of the state in choosing a representative to the legislature.
But what is meant by "representation"? Is representation satisfied
simply by election of one responsible to the majority of voters
in a district? Or does it signify something more? Should different
bodies or blocs of voters have representatives in the legislature
and if so, where must the line be drawn as to definition or size
of the group or bloc.80
The answer to the definition of representation is necessarily a
moral one. There is no doubt that the overwhelming attitude
toward the question is that legislators are representatives of the
majority-usually a political party-of the voters. That they might
also represent distinctive groups in the body politic is possible
but, at this time, more than likely accidental. Perhaps more con-
templative and deliberative legislative bodies can yet reach the
answer to this riddle.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
ment seeking to justify population variances in congressional districting on con-
sideration of percentage eligible voters among the total population. The court re-
served the question of the validity of apportionment on an eligible voter base
because it held that Missouri had not applied the consideration uniformly. In
Klahr v. Williams, 313 F. Supp. 148 (D.C. Ariz. 1970), a three-judge federal
district court citing Burns invalidated as an apportionment base a computer de-
termined conversion of 1968 voter registrations to the 1960 census on a propor-
tionate basis. The court did permit 1970 elections to be conducted under the
plan because of lack of time to come up with a new plan, the immediate pen-
dency of the report of the 1970 census which would permit new apportionment,
and the fact that the plan found invalid more nearly approached the one man-
one vote principle than the court's own earlier ordered plan. See n. 7 supra for
present districting in state legislatures on a voter registration basis.
80 Professor Irwin makes a searching inquiry of the theory and process of
representation in his article Representation and Election: The Reapportionment
Cases in Retrospect, 67 Miona. L. REv. 729 (1969). In like manner the "concept
of effective representation" is the central topic of the author of the Comment,
Effective Representation and Multimember Districts, 68 Micr. L. REV. 1577
(1970). Professor Dixon declares that one of the main themes of his thorough
survey of the reapportionment era is "in reapportionment more is involved than the
sell-centered constitutional right of a voter to cast a vote which, at least in
mathematical, nonfunctional terms, is weighted equally with votes of others
throu~hout the districts which comprise the total legislative constituency. That
more to quote Chief Justice Warren in his basic reapportionment opinion of 1964
is 'fair and effective representation." DIxoN, supra note 8, at 17.
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Parting Thoughts-Some Predictions
As legislatures approach Round Two, many will have safely
weathered Round One and will have this prior experience to
build on. Others will not have achieved a satisfactory post-Baker
redistricting and will have to readjust their procedures to achieve
a plan which will pass court review for constitutionality. What-
ever their past successes, it now appears imperative that legisla-
tures must act more carefully than ever before in striving for the
reapportionment ideal of one man-one vote. The requirements
of rationality seem more demanding than in the past and efforts
to minimize the effectiveness of minority voters whether by
single district gerrymander, submersion of them in multimember
districts, or other yet-to-be-discovered devices will be subjected to
more scrutiny than previously. More state constitutional limita-
tions against splitting county or other political subdivisions in
creating districts or limitations on the number of such subdivisions
which may make up a district will fall."' Variances between dis-
tricts will likely become suspect, and mathematical exactness will
be demanded subject, however, to inspection for impermissible
considerations. 8
In all the trauma of legislative and congressional redistricting,
however, legislators will find one area to be thankful for: they
81 An interesting argument advanced in support of minor population variance
in Missouri's congressional redistricting plan struck down in *irkpatrick v. Preis-
ler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969), was that by drawing district lines along existing county,
municipal or other political subdivision boundaries, the state was minimizing the
opportunities for partisan gerrymandering. The court termed tbis argument "no
more than a variant of the argument, already rejected, that considerations of
practical politics can justify population disparities." Id. at 534. Several state con-
stitutions contain provisions prohibiting joinder of part of one county to another
county in the formation of legislative districts. It seems clear that these provi-
sions must defer to the Kirkpatrick ruling when in conflict with the equal popula-
tion standard. For provisions concerning house districts, see IowA CONST. ART.
I1, § 37; IDA. CoNsT. ART. III, § 5; Ky. CoNsT. § 38. For senatorial district pro-
visions, see CAL. CONST. ART. IV, § 6; IDA. CONST. ART. IM, § 5; TENN. CoNST.
AnT. II, § 6; UTAH CoNsr. ART. IX, § 4. Editor's Note: Upton v. Begley, at Frank-
fort #364 E.D. Ky. jan. 13, 1971 Fed. Ct. invalidated Ky. Const. § 33 which
prohibited splitting of counties to form Legislative districts.
82Th mathematical precision demanded by the court may not make gerry-
mandering more difficult, only more complex. Political professionals agree that
computer systems are essential tools in the redistricting battles of the Seventies,
and a multitude of data processing firms have sprung up to offer their services,
for a fee, to parties and legislatures. A Democratic National Comittee Official
rep~orts that 'at least 20" political consulting fims have approached him with
redistricting plans. Redistricting Battles Will Shape House for Decade, CoNG. Q.
VOL. XXVIII, No. 48, Nov. 20, 1970, Page 2822.
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will not have to reapportion the districts of their representatives
to the United States Senate.83
83 It may seem humorous even to suggest that apportionment issues could
ever be raised in the choosing of representatives elected on an at-large basis, but
see Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
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APPENDIX A-1
THE BOOK OF THE STATES
APPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATURES*
SENATE
Larg- Aver-
Year Num- est Percent of age Minimum
Pres- of her num- deviation in actual popu- percent of
nt Most Num- oft er of vs. average population lotion population
appor- recent Num- her multi- seats per seat each necessary to
tion- appor- her of member in seat elect majority
ment tion- of dis- districts dis- Greatest (thou-
State by ment seats tricts (a) trict + - Average sands)Present 1962
Alabama .................. L 1965 35 26
Alaska ...................... B 1968 20 11
Arizona (b) ............ C 1966 30 8
Arkansas .................. B 1965 35 25
California ................ L 1965 40 40
Colorado .................. L 1967 35 35
Connecticut .............. L 1965 36 36
Delaware .................. L 1967 19 19
Florida .................... C 1967 48 17
Georgia .................... L 1968 56 38
Hawaii ............Con 1968 26(c) 8
Idaho ........................ L 1966 35 35
Illinois ...................... B 1965 58 58
Indiana ............... L 1965(e) 50 31
Iowa ................. Con 1969(f) 50 50
Kansas ............... C 1968 40 28
Kentucky .................. L 1963 38 38
Louisiana ................ L 1966 39 27
Maine ...................... C 1967 32 32
Maryland .................. L 1965 43 16
Massachusetts .......... C 1960 40 40
Michigan .................. C 1964 38 38
Minnesota ................ L 1966 67 67
Mississippi ................ C 1967 52 36
Missouri .................... B 1966 34 34
Montana .................. C 1965 55 31
Nebraska .................. L 1967 49 49
Nevada .................... L 1965 20 8
New Hampshire ....... L 1965 24 24
New Jersey .............. Con 1966 40 15
New Mexico ............. C 1966 42 42
New York ................ C 1966 57 57
North Carolina ........ L 1966 50 33
North Dakota .......... C 1965 49 39
Ohio ......................... Con 1967 33 33
Oklahoma ................ C 1964 48 48
Oregon ...................... L 1961 30 19
Pennsylvania ............ C 1966 50 50
Rhode Island ............ L 1966 50 50
South Carolina ........ L 1968 46 20
South Dakota .......... L 1965 35 29
Tennessee .......... Con 1966 33 33
Texas ............. L 1965 31 31
Utah ........................ L 1965 28 28
Vermont .................. L 1965 30 12
Virginia .................... L 1964 40 33
Washington .............. L 1965 49 49
West Virginia .......... L 1964 34 17
'Wiscosin ................ C 1964 33 33
Wyoming .................. C 1965 30 17
29 14
29 13
7 16
14 9
13 15
7 6
23 19
10 1
5 5
13 19
24 6
19 15
7 7
15 15
7 6
6 9
51 22
17 20
9 10
18 16
8 14
1 0
25 13
13 11
5 4
17 21
13 7
11 21
11 13
12 14
29 28
9 6
13 15
10 12
9 10
28 15
25 49
10 9
19 12
13 13
16 17
16 14
11 10
16 34
23 23
18 13
22 16
34 31
14 16
36 35
8 93 48
8 10 51
3 43 52
4 51 49
7 393 49
2 50 50
10 70 48
6 28 53
2 103 51
5 70 49
5 10(d) 51
10 19 47
3 174 50
6 93 49
3 55 50
3 57 51
12 80 47
6 84 48
4 30 51
7 72 47
4 63(g) 50
0 206 53
5 51 48
7 42 49
2 127 52
8 12 47
4 29 49
9 14 50
5 25 52
6 152 50
13 23 46
4 285 49
6 91 49
5 13 47
4 294 50
6 49 49
13 59 47
4 226 50
8 18 50
4 52 50
9 19 47
6 108 49
4 309 49
15 32 48
9 13 49
9 99 48
6 58 48
12 55 47
7 120 48
12 11 47
a The data for this table were adapted from Apportionment in the Nineteen Sixties, The National Municipal
League, New York, New York and updated by the Council of State Governments for this edition.
Abbreviations: B-Board or Commission; C-Court; Con-Constitution- L-Legislature; N.A.-Not Available.
(a) 9 grouping of a floterial district and one or more individual districts is counted as a multimember
district. Floterial districts are formed by combining two or more districts, at least one of which elects its own
representative, into a larger (floterial) district for the election of one or more additional representatives.
Floterial districts are used in Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Tennessee and Virginia.
* Reprinted by permission of the Council of State Governments.
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APPENDIX A-2
LEGISLATURES AND LEGISLATION
APPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATUBES*
HOUSE
Larg- Aver-
Year Nuns- est Percent of age Minimum
Pres- of ber numa- deviation in actual popu- percent of
ent most Num- of ber of vs. average population lation population
appor- recent Num- her multi- seats per seat each necessary to
tion- appor- ber of member in seat elect majority
ment tion- of di- districts dis- Greatest (thou-
by ment seats tricts (a) trict + - Average sands) Present 1962 State
c 1965 106 43 25
B 1961 40 19 4
C 1966 60 8 8
B 1965 100 44 27
L 1965 80 80 0
L 1967 65 65 0
L 1965 177 177 0
L 1967 89 89 0
C 1967 119 24 21
L 1968 195 118 47
Con 1968 51 25 19
L 1966 70 42 28
B 1965 177 59 59
L 1965 100 89 25
Con 1969(f)100 100 0
L 1966 125 125 0
L 1968 100 100 0
L 1966 105 49 28
L 1964 151 114 15
L 1965 142 29 20
L 1967 240 175 56
C 1964 110 110 0
L 1966 185 120 15
C 1967 122 52 84
B 1966 163 163 0
C 1965 104 88 27
.. 1W8 T6 11 "'.
L 1965 400 198 116
C 1969 80 89 89
L 1965 70 70 0
B 1966 150 150 0
L 1966 120 49 41
C 1965 98 89 89
Con 1967 99 99 0
C 1964 99 99 0
L 1967 60 82 15
C 1966 208 208 0
L 1966 100 100 0
L 1961 124 46 29
L 1965 75 89 22
Con 1966 99 98 18
L 1967 150 80 18
L 1965 69 69 0
L 1965 150 72 86
L 1964 100 68 20
L 1965 99 56 42
L 1964 100 47 21
C 1964 100 100 0
L 1963 61 28 12
20 28
14 86
80 7
18 14
1 18
1 18
1 88
1 11
22 5
7 25
8 15
2 82
8 9
15 10
1 7
1 11
1 88
7 21
11 106
22 86
8 86
1 1
2 13
10 10
1 9
12 25
16 16
7 63
3 10
1 86
1 9
7 14
8 10
1 18
1 18
7 35
1 16
1 19
11 58
9 19
3 28
15 81
1 7
15 11
9 20
8 18
14 46
1 82
11 47
7 81 48 26 ................ Alabama
10 5 48 49 .................... Alaska
3 22 51 N.A ................... Arizona
6 18 48 33 ................ Arkansas
5 196 49 45 .............. California
5 27 54 82 ................ Colorado
18 14 44 12 ............ Connecticut
4 18 51 19 ................ Delaware
2 42 50 12 .................. Florida
8 20 48 22 ..................Georgia
6 5(d) 47 48 .................. Hawaii
10 10 47 33 ...................... Idaho
8 171 49 40 .................... Illinois
4 47 49 85 .................. Indiana
8 28 49 27 ...................... Iowa
8 18 49 19 .................... Kansas
18 80 45 84 ................ Kentucky
8 31 47 84 .............. Louisian
14 6 48 40 .................... Maine
6 22 48 25 ................ Maryland
10 22 48 45 ........ Massachusetts
1 71 51 44 ................ Michigan
6 25 47 85 .............. Minnesota
5 18 48 28 .............. Mississippi
8 27 49 20 ................ Missouri
6 6 48 37 ................ Montana
................ Nebraska
1 7 48 .................. Nevada
9 1 46 44 .... New Hampshire
10 76 48 47 ......... New Jersey
10 14 46 27 . NewMexico
3 108 49 83 .............. New York
7 88 48 27 ...... North Carolina
5 6 47 40 ........ North Dakota
6 98 47 80 ...................... Ohio
4 24 49 80 .............. Oklahoma
8 29 48 48 .................. Oregon
6 56 47 88 . Pennsylvania
7 9 49 47 . Rhode Island
10 19 46 46 ...... South Carolina
8 9 47 89 ........ South Dakota
7 86 47 29 .............. Tennessee
12 78 45 89 ...................... Texas
7 18 48 88 ...................... Utah
4 1(d) 49 12 ................ Vermont
8 40 47 87 ........... Virginia
7 29 47 85 ......... Washington
10 19 46 40 ........ West Virginia
11 40 45 40 .............. Wisconsin
9 5 46 86 ................ .Wyoming
(b) The Legislature was directed by court order on July 22, 1969 to reapportion and redistrict prior to
the 1970 elections.
(c) Effective Nov. 1970: the 8th Senatorial District will be allocated an additional senator. The two
senators from this district will each be entitled to only %i of a vote in the Legislature.
(d) Average number of registered voters per seat.
(e) A federal court panel reapportioned lgilative districts in Dec. 1969. However, their plan has been
appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.
(f) Effective Nov. 1970.
(g) Average number of legal voters per seat.
* Reprinted by permission of the Council of State Governments.
